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 Firefighters and Information Sharing:  
Smart Practice or Bad Idea?1 
Bryan Heirston 
While our information sharing capabilities have improved significantly, substantial 
obstacles remain. We must continue to break down information barriers among 
federal, state, local, and tribal partners and the private sector. 
-2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security2 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has over one million firefighters serving in over thirty thousand fire 
departments that respond to over twenty-four million emergencies annually.3 In their 
efforts to prevent and respond to life and property loss, firefighters enter homes, 
businesses, vehicles, and other assets, without a search warrant, thousands of times 
each day. This access has allowed firefighters to identify potential terrorist activities, 
oftentimes unexpectedly for both the firefighters and the potential terrorists. U.S. 
firefighters may be in a unique position to positively or negatively impact our current 
homeland security information-sharing efforts.   
This article identifies smart practices, comparing and contrasting the information-
sharing activities of the New York City Fire Department’s Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy (FDNY Strategy), the U.S. Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise 
draft concept plan (FSIE CONPLAN), the UK’s Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA) 
and current ad hoc U.S. fire service information-sharing activities. Matrixes contrast 
legal compliance, political acceptability, Target Capabilities List linkage, operational 
impact, and cost for the FDNY Strategy, FSIE CONPLAN, CCA, and current fire service 
information-sharing environment.4    
Current U.S. Fire Service Information-Sharing Environment 
Nationally, fire departments have impressive staffing and capabilities. According to the 
National Fire Protection Association, total employment in firefighting occupations was 
1,141,900 in 2006, of which more than 823,950 were part-time or volunteers.5 Of the 
30,635 fire departments in the United States, 4,052 are career departments, with the 
majority of departments (26,583) staffed by volunteers.6 Firefighters are often the first 
response personnel at the scene of emergency incidents, where they perform a myriad of 
critical life-saving and property-conservation functions. Fire departments and 
firefighters are located throughout the country, from densely populated urban 
environments, residential neighborhoods and airports, to chemical plants, oil refineries, 
wild lands, and large unincorporated areas.7  
As few as fifteen of the thirty thousand U.S. fire departments formally use terrorism 
indicators and communicate the information gathered to the homeland security 
community.8 Despite the obvious potential benefit of thousands of firefighters as 
consumers and collectors of information, the current information-sharing environment 
is ad hoc at best and in many locales, non-existent. It appears few firefighters have 
received formal training in what terrorist indicators to look for or how to communicate 
or request information.   
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In late 2002 President Bush commissioned the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission). The 9/11 
Commission’s Final Report included recommendations designed to guard against future 
attacks. One recommendation involved unity of effort. The following excerpt may have 
application to the fire service sharing information with the intelligence community:  
National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the 
home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all source 
analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to “connect the dots.” 
No one component holds all the relevant information.9 
An example of successful informal information sharing effort resulted from a DHS-
sponsored New Mexico Technology course at the Energetic Materials Research and 
Testing Center (EMRTC). After a local fire department hazardous materials team 
member attended an EMRTC class, the local fire department responded to a “smoke 
condition” inside a building. During their check of the building for smoke, which proved 
to be negative, the firefighters came across fourteen one-gallon plastic containers filled 
with an unknown substance. The on-scene incident commander requested the Haz Mat 
unit, and upon their arrival, they determined the substance in the containers to be urine. 
The incident commander did not think anything of it, nor did the police supervisor at 
the scene. However, the member of the Haz Mat unit who had attended the EMRTC 
class indicated that the urine could be a component of a bomb, and because of this, the 
fire department contacted the FBI. Further searches of the house turned up an 
additional twenty empty containers and maps and train schedules of the New York 
metropolitan area. The FBI took the tenant of the apartment into custody. At the time of 
this writing, the FBI investigation continues.  
 Successful emergency prevention strategies have reduced fire loss in the U.S. 
through a unity of effort from a diversified cadre of citizens, federal, state, local, private, 
and public partners working together and sharing information to prevent life and 
property loss from fire and other emergencies. These fire prevention strategies may be 
useful in terrorism prevention efforts.10   
For years it has been a common practice in many U.S. fire departments to share 
information relating to potential illegal activities with the law enforcement community.  
For example, in Oklahoma City, if firefighters respond to a fire in the kitchen area, and 
while searching for victims or ventilating the structure notice a potential 
methamphetamine lab in the bedroom, the police department will be contacted. If 
children are present, the Department of Human Services will be notified. When 
domestic violence is suspected, the local law enforcement agency is notified. In these 
instances, the information is usually communicated by a radio call to the 911-dispatch 
center. This collaboration also occurs at non-emergency operations, such as fire code 
inspections, where firefighters sometimes report large quantities of explosives, 
chemicals, or firearms at businesses that typically do not handle those products.  
On the other hand, this spirit of collaboration can lead to illegal collection plans. In 
2007 a law enforcement representative approached an Oklahoma City firefighter and 
inquired if he would conduct a fire inspection at a local mosque in order to identify 
potential terrorist-related information. Fortunately, the firefighter’s supervisor realized 
the legal exposure associated with the plan and denied permission for the firefighter to 
participate. One aspect of determining whether information collected by a firefighter is 
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legal or “fruit of a poisonous tree” may lie in whether the firefighter identified potential 
terrorist-related items or information during the normal course of their duty or the 
firefighter was assigned to collect information on suspected terrorists.  
National Strategy for the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Concept of 
Operations PLAN (FSIE CONPLAN) 
The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A)-coordinated FSIE initiative is a 
national strategic approach to information sharing between the U.S. fire service and 
homeland security community. Homeland security affiliates for the FSIE were identified 
within the FSIE framework as federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector “agencies or 
organizations that are stakeholders of FSIE initiatives, either as collaborators or 
customers” for the DHS.11 The FSIE CONPLAN appears to be a strategic extension and 
formal expansion of the current informal fire service information-sharing environment 
between the fire service and homeland security communities. The primary FSIE 
CONPLAN venues for sharing information are federal, state, and local fusion centers. 
Working within the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, fire service fusion 
center liaisons or representatives would act as nodes, and the fusion centers would act 
as hubs for receiving and disseminating relevant information in a timely and actionable 
manner.12  
The FSIE CONPLAN appears to represent a logical progression in maximizing the 
current homeland security information-sharing culture. Given the current and future 
threat environments in this long-term conflict (sometimes called the global war on 
terrorism), it might be careless or even negligent not to build on the FSIE CONPLAN to 
formally incorporate over one million firefighters into the information-sharing 
community.  
New York City Fire Department Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 
Strategy (FDNY Strategy) 
According to the 9/11 Commission, the lack of information sharing on 9/11 may have 
resulted in unwarranted fatalities for civilians, firefighters, and other responders in New 
York City: 
Just as in the North Tower, callers from below and above the impact zone were 
advised to remain where they were and wait for help. The operators were not 
given any information about the inability to conduct rooftop rescues and 
therefore could not advise callers that they had essentially been ruled out. This 
lack of information combined with the general advice to remain where they were, 
may have caused civilians above the impact not to attempt to descend, although 
stairwell A may have been passable.13 
Regarding information-sharing with the FDNY on 9/11, FDNY fire chiefs testified to the 
9/11 Commission that the lack of information sharing, particularly between the fire 
command staff and other Emergency Services Sector agencies, adversely impacted 
operations.14    
As a direct result of 9/11, the FDNY released their comprehensive Terrorism and 
Disaster Preparedness FDNY Strategy (FDNY Strategy) in 2007. Based on my review of 
the FDNY Strategy, the fire department has taken administrative (but not necessarily 
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operational) steps to operate safely and effectively use information sharing in the post-
9/11, multifaceted, all-hazards threat environment. The following statement in the 
FDNY Strategy indicates that the fire department is in a position to address a number of 
the information-sharing challenges within the homeland security community.  
An examination of the events leading to 9/11 highlighted many gaps in 
information-gathering capabilities and information-sharing protocols within the 
homeland security community. The FDNY recognized that the Department could 
help to fill some of these gaps by contributing to local intelligence-gathering 
efforts. When routinely shared with intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
the information gathered by FDNY personnel could make a significant 
contribution to existing intelligence and lead to the identification and disruption 
of terrorist activities. Terrorism-related information can be gathered by the 
FDNY in many ways. During the course of routine building inspections, arson 
investigations and response to fires and medical emergencies, FDNY personnel 
have unique access to homes and buildings that generally are concealed from 
outsiders.15 
According to FDNY Commissioner Scoppetta and Fire Chief Cassano, the FDNY 
leadership employed the insight and skills from a cross section of FDNY’s considerable 
work force to develop the FDNY Strategy.  The FDNY Strategy was designed to provide 
direction and unity toward enhanced preparedness.16  
The FDNY Strategy is organized around four articles. Article 1 (Strategy and Purpose) 
addresses the foundation of preparedness based on the current and future threat 
environment for man-made and natural disasters. Article 2 (mission and focus) 
examines the life-safety oriented work and focus of the FDNY, based on pre-determined 
significant issues that must be addressed to achieve the pre-identified levels of 
preparedness. Article 3 (Operational Readiness) describes how the FDNY ensures that 
firefighters have “the tools, training and support they need to do their job.”17 Article 3 
also identifies a number of the National Preparedness Goal components to assist FDNY 
firefighters in achieving the evaluation points identified in Article 4 of the FDNY 
Strategy. The National Preparedness Goal components identified in the FDNY Strategy 
are “planning; organization and leadership; equipment and systems; training; exercises, 
evaluations and corrective actions; and personnel.”18 Article 4 (Coordination and 
Evaluation) is the final article of the FDNY Strategy and utilizes an “FDNY Strategy 
Cycle” to provide a systematic approach in identifying hazards, evaluating risks, 
implementing control measures and evaluating the FDNY Strategy. 
United Kingdom Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA) 
A review of the terrorism information-sharing systems in Canada, Australia, Israel, and 
the United Kingdom, as they relate to fire service and homeland security information 
sharing partnerships, resulted in the identification of one applicable information-
sharing legislative action, the United Kingdom’s Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA).  
This article utilizes the sections of the CCA relevant to England exclusively and does not 
consider the other UK countries due to their relatively small and often administrative 
CCA variances. The CCA is the product of a legislative evolution that began with the 
United Kingdom’s Emergency Powers Act of 1920, continued with the 1948 Civil 
Protection Act, and later the foot-and-mouth outbreak, and World Trade Center attacks.  
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The CCA may be the most comprehensive single national fire service-related 
information-sharing document analyzed for this article. For example, in England, the 
fire service roles and responsibilities regarding information sharing are clearly 
identified in the CCA and in some cases the local fire brigade is mandated to play a lead 
role. In contrast, the National Information Sharing Strategy does not identify the U.S. 
fire service anywhere in its forty pages.19 
The common law process used to adopt the CCA does not appear to be substantially 
different from the adoption of many post-9/11 homeland security-related U.S. 
guidelines, policies, strategies, presidential directives, and public laws relating to 
counterterrorism information sharing.20 The difference is that the U.S. has chosen not to 
explicitly require information sharing between the fire service and the homeland 
security community, while England has. In both countries national crises occurred that 
necessitated change to lessen or eliminate future man-made and natural disasters. Both 
the United States and England analyzed the issues, sought input from the major 
stakeholders, developed wide-ranging policies, strategies, and laws, and instituted 
measures in an effort to lessen or eliminate future catastrophic events.  
The result has been an informal information-sharing environment within the U.S. fire 
service that is often non-mandatory, casual, and limited in structure and scope. In 
England, the CCA requires fire brigades to participate in the Local Resilience Forums 
and to share information both informally and formally. The majority of the fifty-seven 
regulations in Part One of the CCA significantly enhance the probability of informal and 
formal information sharing with England’s fire service. In the United States, DHS 
funding – primarily in the form of grants to fusion centers and other information-
sharing enterprises – has been the catalyst for fire service information sharing related to 
terrorism. Also in the United States, most firefighters may not know what terrorism 
indicators to look for, when to look for them, or how to share the information.  
The CCA was designed to provide a single legislative point for wide-ranging 
protection of civilians and military from significant all-hazard disasters. Part One 
identifies and assigns local arrangements for information sharing and formally 
recognizes fire brigades as an integral part of England’s intelligence cycle. Part One also 
identifies the legal framework regarding the roles and responsibilities for local Level 1 
and 2 responders. Level 1 responders are referred to as “core responders” and include 
emergency services such as police, fire, ambulance, and maritime and coastguard 
agencies, as well as other local authorities such as environmental and health care 
agencies.21 Category 2 responders or “co-operating responders” include utilities and 
transportation agencies.22  
Part Two of the CCA focuses on the emergency powers at the regional and national 
governmental levels and includes special legislative actions and authority at the policy 
level that may be needed to address the effects of significant events such as the London 
7/7 subway bombings, or the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. Part Three addresses 
the general, fiscal, and administrative issues relating to implementing and maintaining 
the CCA.23  
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COMPARISON OF FOUR FIREFIGHTER-RELATED INFORMATION-
SHARING SYSTEMS 
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in 
its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. 
— Niccolò Machiavelli24 
 
The fundamental qualitative premise underlying this article is that there are lessons to 
be learned by the U.S. fire service and homeland security community from current 
information-sharing systems (New York City Fire Department Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy, current U.S. Fire Service information sharing, U.S. Fire Service 
Intelligence Enterprise, and England’s application of the U.K. Civil Contingencies Act of 
2004). The following matrixes and related information compare the value of the four 
information-sharing systems relative to each other based on five criteria. 
The five criteria (legal compliance, political acceptability, Target Capabilities List 
linkage, operational impact, and cost) are used with each of the four information-
sharing systems (FDNY Strategy, FSIE CONPLAN, CCA and current ad hoc U.S. fire 
service information-sharing) to identify strengths and weaknesses applicable to 
improving information-sharing between the U.S. fire service and other homeland 
security partners.   
Legal Compliance 
Given that most firefighters are not actively aware of or engaged in reporting potential 
terrorist indicators, the fire service has not yet created any significant legal exposure or 
civil-liberties violations. Based on Todd Masse’s findings, the fire service has a legal 
responsibility to report suspicious activity.25 As a counter point to Masse’s findings, in 
December 2007 the ACLU raised questions regarding firefighters’ collecting and sharing 
potential terrorist information. The ACLU position indicated excessive potential loss of 
personal privacy rights would be the result of firefighters’ collecting and sharing 
information.26  
With that said, the four information-sharing systems were evaluated for compliance 
with legal rulings as they relate to entry onto or into property by firefighters during 
emergency and non-emergency operations. The U.S. cases regarded as applicable for fire 
personnel collecting potential terrorist information were: Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 
499 (1978); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); and Camara v. Municipal Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), as well as the Homeland 
Security Act 2002, Subtitle I “Information Sharing.”27   
In the case of Camara the court indicated “The basic purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth, through its 
prohibition of ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” 
Firefighters in the performance of their emergency duties to save lives and property 
were not considered to be “arbitrary” or “unreasonable.”28   
Relative to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, it appears the U.S. fire service and 
homeland security community have a duty to share information (at least unclassified), 
as exemplified by the following:  
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(1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, 
including the intelligence community, shall, through information sharing 
systems, share homeland security information with Federal agencies and 
appropriate State and local personnel to the extent such information may be 
shared, as determined in accordance with subsection (a), together with 
assessments of the credibility of such information. (2) Each information sharing 
system through which information is shared under paragraph (1) shall— (A) have 
the capability to transmit unclassified or classified information, though the 
procedures and recipients for each capability may differ; (B) have the capability 
to restrict delivery of information to specified subgroups by geographic location, 
type of organization, position of a recipient within an organization, or a 
recipient’s need to know such information; (C) be configured to allow the efficient 
and effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to appropriate State 
and local personnel. 29 
The court rulings advocate firefighters entering homes, businesses, vehicles, and other 
assets without warrants to prevent and respond to potential life and property loss. The 
court rulings do not allow for “arbitrary invasions” or “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” by fire personnel. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 indicates local agencies 
have a legal responsibility to share potential terrorist-related information.  
The following matrices and information-sharing criteria discussions are organized 
from highest to lowest for each measure. For example, the matrix for legal compliance is 




Information-Sharing Option Legal Compliance 
FDNY Strategy  High  
FSIE  High 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low/Average 
CCA Unknown 
Figure 1.   Legal Compliance 
The FDNY Strategy received the highest value due to the use of accepted local, state, and 
federal strategies, laws, and guidelines. (At the time of this writing, the FDNY Strategy 
was the only completed U.S. fire service information-sharing document that had 
received and passed a legal review).  
According to Keeley Townsend of the DHS I&A, “The FSIE is being designed in 
compliance with all federal laws and will be reviewed by DHS Privacy, Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties, Security, and DHS OGC, as well as the DOJ Global Justice Information 
Sharing Initiative. We are also adhering to all criminal intelligence laws, when 
applicable.”30 Based on the review of current FSIE documents and Townsend’s previous 
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work with the FDNY Strategy, it is anticipated that the finished FSIE products will meet 
or exceed the established legal requirements.31  
The legality of the current information-sharing environment is questionable, since 
most firefighters do not know what terrorism indicators to look for, when to look for 
them, or how to report them. Given that most firefighters are not actively aware of or 
engaged in reporting potential terrorist indicators, the fire service has not created any 
significant legal exposure or civil liberties violations. Based on Masse’s findings, the fire 
service has a legal responsibility to report suspicious activity.32 
England’s CCA information collection and sharing structure was based on the United 
Kingdom’s system of government and did not address the legality of information 
collection. The CCA exceeded the three other information-sharing systems relating to 
legal information sharing of open-source, sensitive, and classified information between 
the core and cooperating responders.  
Political Acceptability 
For this article, “political acceptability” refers to policy-level support. The decision 
makers generally considered were formal policy groups accountable for the strategy, 
concept of operations, or legislation. Examples could be local, state, or national 
governing bodies. In some circumstances consideration was given to labor 
representatives, such as the International Association of Firefighters or the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which might have significant influence and interest in the political 
acceptability of the strategy, act, or information-sharing arrangement. 
 
 
Information-Sharing Option Political Acceptability 
FDNY Strategy  High  
CCA Good 
Current U.S. Fire Service Average 
FSIE Unknown 
Figure 2.   Political Acceptability 
The FDNY Strategy incorporates FDNY policy-level fire officers who use the 
requirements and guidelines of numerous accepted local, state, and federal documents. 
The CCA was the most politically comprehensive, single-source fire service 
information-sharing document analyzed for this article. As stated earlier, the U.S. 
National Information Sharing Strategy does not identify the fire service anywhere in 
the document.33 In England’s CCA, the fire service roles and responsibilities regarding 
information sharing are clearly defined at the national, regional, and local levels, and in 
the case of the London fire brigade, the fire service is mandated to take a lead role. 
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Applicability of the current fire service information-sharing environment to the U.S. 
public, policy groups, labor unions, governmental agencies, and other related 
organizations is in the early stages of development. At the national level, Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff advocated for the inclusion of firefighters 
in state and local fusion centers.34 
Based on the December 2008 draft of the FSIE CONPLAN, the CONPLAN appears to 
be a more practical and robust direction for the U.S. fire service.  
Target Capabilities List Linkage 
In 2004, DHS released fifteen National Planning Scenarios.35 The National Planning 
Scenarios listed and explained the hazards and risks associated with high-impact events 
that would significantly affect local emergency-response capabilities. The capabilities 
identified in the planning scenarios resulted in thirty-six target capabilities within four 
mission areas (Prevention, Protection, Response, and Recovery). The criteria for this 
article relied on four of the nine “prevention target capabilities” listed in the DHS 
National Preparedness Guidelines.36 Four target capabilities were selected due to their 
correlation to information sharing.37   
• Intelligence/information sharing and dissemination;  
• CBRNE detection; 
• Information gathering and recognition of indicators;  
• Warnings, intelligence analysis, and production. 
 
Information-Sharing Option Target Capabilities List Linkage 
FDNY Strategy  High  
FSIE Good 
CCA Average 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low 
Figure 3.   Target Capabilities List Linkage 
The FDNY used the fifteen planning scenarios to enhance their protection and response 
missions and to compete for DHS grant funding. The FDNY Strategy exceeded the four 
information-sharing target capabilities criteria used for this article by identifying the 
role of the FDNY in all thirty-six target capabilities identified in the National 
Preparedness Guidelines. 
The current FSIE CONPLAN does not specifically address target capabilities. The 
FSIE is given a “good” rating based on information received from the DHS I&A State 
and Local Program Office that indicated “national planning scenarios, attack timelines, 
and universal adversary profiles are being used to guide the information/intelligence 
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requirements identification, and the Target Capabilities List is being used to guide the 
mechanisms of identification, technical assistance, and training.”38 
Of the four information-sharing target capabilities selected for this project, the CCA 
addresses three of the four target capabilities fully, and the CBRNE capability partially. 
Of the four information-sharing target capabilities selected for this project, the 
current fire service role in the homeland security information-sharing environment 
formally utilized only the CBRNE detection target capabilities component through the 
DHS FY 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP).  
Operational Impact 
How the current ad hoc fire service information-sharing arrangements, strategy, or CCA 
would influence the operation of the homeland security information-sharing community 
was measured initially by collecting key indicators of success, such as those identified in 
the documents themselves and, in some cases post-product analysis. 
 
Information-Sharing Option Operational Impact 
CCA  Good  
FDNY Strategy Average  
FSIE Low 
Current U.S. Fire Service Unacceptable 
Figure 4.   Operational Impact 
In England, the 2006 National Capability Survey suggested that local responders have 
made good progress in enhancing the operational information-sharing impact of the 
Civil Contingencies Act.39 “The vast majority of Local Resilience Forums and supporting 
task groups are up and running and functioning effectively. Almost all local responders 
are happy that Local Resilience Forums are providing the right level of engagement to 
enable members to perform the tasks mandated by the Act.”40   
The FDNY Strategy may have relevance for increasing the U.S. fire service 
operational impact in the all-hazards information-sharing environment. For example, 
the FDNY Bureau of Investigation maintains numerous important connections with the 
homeland security community; they are implementing a network-centric, information-
sharing-based command system that has the potential to significantly increase real-time 
information sharing among a myriad of local, state, and federal partners; and they 
communicate national and local information to tens of thousands of fire personal and 
homeland security partners through their weekly Watchline e-mail. What appears to 
make the Watchline unique is a fire service operational orientation and specific tactical 
comments on eight to ten all-hazard fire service related issues.  
The FSIE CONPLAN contains specific accountability components for the 
management of the information-sharing tasks. If the current information-sharing gap is 
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the catalyst for increased information sharing with the homeland security community, 
then the current FSIE CONPLAN is moving towards enhancing the operational impact 
of information sharing. 
The operational impact of the current information-sharing environment was difficult 
to quantify. The anecdotal successes associated with information sharing among 
homeland security and the fire service, combined with the recent emergence of 
strategies and technical assistance programs, suggests that there is a heightened 
awareness of the potential for firefighters as sensors of opportunity who identify 
potential terrorist activities and as consumers of information for specific terrorist 
targets. Considering that the U.S. is at war on two fronts and that domestic and 
international terrorists have sworn to cripple the United States through terrorism, the 
current organized information sharing between the fire service and homeland security 
community is unacceptable. 
Costs 
The United States spends approximately $100 billion per year on homeland security.41 
Homeland security expenses include federal, state, and local law enforcement, and 
emergency medical, public works, and fire services, but exclude most funding for the 
armed forces.42 Generally speaking, the national effort to enhance homeland security 
through information sharing with the fire service appears to involve a relatively small 
fiscal impact. Costs include the human resources the fire service and homeland security 
communities have committed specifically to information sharing. Most costs appeared 
to be “soft costs” absorbed by current fire and intelligence organizations responsible for 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. 
 
Information-Sharing Option Costs 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low 
FDNY Strategy Average 
FSIE Average 
CCA Average 
Figure 5.   Costs 
The cost of developing and implementing the FDNY Strategy appears to have been 
incorporated into the operating budget and supplemented with DHS grant funding for 
equipment. For example, the cost of producing and distributing the Watchline as well as 
the proposed Network-Centric Command System appear to have been developed within 
the FDNY’s FY 2006-07 operating budget. 
Data identifying costs were not available in the FSIE CONPLAN. Based on 
information within the CONPLAN framework, requirements, mechanisms, technical 
assistance, and training, the costs may be reasonable considering the DHS budget. 
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At the time of this writing a review of available literature indicated that the CCA has 
not been audited for cost in England. Scotland is auditing their version of the CCA, but 
the results were not available. The costs of implementation of the CCA may have been 
primarily soft costs incorporated into the current budgets for the public and private 















Current U.S. Fire 
Service 
Low/Average Average Low Unacceptable Low 
FDNY Strategy High High High Average  Average 
FSIE High Unknown Good Unknown Average 
CCA Unknown Good Average Good High 
Figure 6.   Information-Sharing Matrix 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations consider existing programs, political concerns, and 
financial constraints associated with the four information-sharing systems. 
Current Fire Service Information-Sharing Recommendations 
Despite all our collective homeland security efforts since 9/11, it appears that the only 
emergency services sector homeland security partners with established access to 
information are those with law enforcement connections. If the fire service is to increase 
its use of all-hazards information in its decision cycles, then homeland security 
information-sharing partners may wish to open up the information-sharing system both 
culturally and politically. The best intelligence should be provided to the widest group of 
decision-makers, including (perhaps especially) those with no historical information-
sharing relationships.  
The four indicators listed below were common among the more than one hundred 
and fifty current homeland security terrorist-related indicators studied. The four 
common terrorist indicators could be printed on business cards with contact 
information of the local information-sharing partner (fire marshal, law enforcement, 
JTTF, fusion center) on the other side of the card. The cards could then be distributed 
through the representative organizations such as the International Association of 
Firefighters, International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the National Volunteer Fire 
Council. 
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1. Suspicious Behavior: Especially unusual nervousness for the situation 
and inappropriate or lack of eye contact.  
2. Unusual supplies for occupancy type (structure or vehicle):  
Especially storing large amounts of chemicals, cash, electronics... 
3. Unusual documents for the occupancy type: Especially maps, books, 
blueprints, literature… of critical infrastructures.  
4. Intelligence gathering: Especially surveillance, taking pictures, video, 
notes, asking questions, attempting to gain access. 
A second recommendation is to use local fire marshals as planning-and-logistics 
officers, specifically for fire personnel (and their families) during extended all-hazards 
responses lasting longer than two operational periods (typically twenty-four hours). 
This will enhance information sharing between families and response personnel. This 
recommendation may reduce anxiety for fire personnel and their families during high-
profile heavily media-covered events. 
FSIE Recommendations 
Regarding the DHS I&A-sponsored FSIE, the FSIE CONPLAN recommendation of a 
national network of fire service and homeland security organizations that share all-
hazard information and intelligence in a collaborative effort to enhance the national 
prevention, preparation, response, and recovery missions should be implemented. The 
FSIE should also continue to work within the Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, the U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Protection Association and others 
to ensure that fire service fusion center liaisons (or representatives) act as nodes and 
that the fusion centers (UASI and state) act as hubs for receiving and disseminating 
relevant information in a timely and actionable manner.   
A final significant FSIE information-sharing recommendation is to increase the 
current level of information sharing across the fire service through social networking. At 
the time of this writing, the DHS I&A is designing a new version of the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) that includes fire service-wide dissemination of 
all locally- and federally-generated information and intelligence products that relate to 
the fire and emergency services.43 If the portal is user-friendly and the information is 
concise, informative, and pertinent to current fire service all-hazards missions, many 
fire personnel may use the information to augment their prevention, preparation, and 
response procedures.44 During a DHS I&A and U.S. Fire Administration-sponsored 
Emergency Services Sector Information Sharing Workshop held in April of 2009, it was 
determined U.S. firefighters, as consumers of intelligence products, did not need to 
know sources, suspect names, or other case-sensitive information, but fire fighters must 
have the following three pieces of information from national, state, or local intelligence 
sources to enhance their response missions and increase survivability for the public and 
emergency responders:  
 
1. Threat Level 
2. Target Hazard(s) 
3. Attack Methodologies 
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FDNY Strategy Recommendations 
Many of the strategies and tactics that FDNY developed for responding to, mitigating, 
and preventing all-hazard disasters can be leveraged by others in the emergency services 
sector, especially fire departments. The FDNY’s considerable human resources and 
other resources have allowed the FDNY to develop strategic approaches and operational 
practices in preparation, prevention, and response to all hazards.45  The FDNY Strategy 
identified numerous ways in which firefighters can produce and consume practical 
preparedness and response information. A number of the following FDNY strategic 
objectives may have application to fire departments throughout the United States. 
One strategic objective involves the use of fire marshals as homeland security liaison 
officers with homeland security partners such as the JTTF, TWIG, FBI, or fusion 
centers. The fire marshals/security liaison officers would share information in 
preparation for generalized or non-specific terrorism threats and participate in the 
investigation of fire or explosion-related terrorism incidents. Fire marshals may be 
useful at potential terrorist emergency scenes to ensure the safety of workers relating to 
secondary devices and scene control.  
If successful in NYC, consideration should be given to incorporating the FDNY 
Network-Centric Command System into the national incident management system for 
use throughout the U.S. fire service to enhance real-time information sharing among 
multi-disciplinary operations within a large-scale command. Another recommendation 
– prompted by the idea of FDNY’s Network-Centric Command System – is to enhance 
information collection and sharing through the use of a diverse suite of small-unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and possibly intervention operations. The 
Naval War College’s Global Hawk or a similar less expensive system might be leveraged 
by the fire service and homeland security partners for real-time information sharing 
during pre-planning, response, and recovery missions on large scale, natural or man-
made disasters. 
Finally, with permission of the FDNY and working in conjunction with the 
DHS/FEMA Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing Analysis 
Center, the FDNY Watchline could be modified and distributed to the U.S. fire service. A 
national Watchline-type program, with state and regional sections, could be coordinated 
and managed through U.S. Fire Administration. Using the fusion centers as venues for a 
Watchline-type product might enhance relationship building between the fire service 
and the intelligence community working in the state and regional fusion centers.  
CCA Recommendations 
The primary recommendation derived from the CCA for this article was the modification 
of the current National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) “Sharing Information 
with State, Local and Tribal Governments” section to include language extrapolated 
from the CCA Part One Regulations 55-57, “Role of London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority.” Modification of the NSIS may enhance information sharing 
through the establishment of formalized local and regional networks similar to those 
found in England. Unlike England, U.S. information sharing is currently not required 
among America’s core responders, which may increase the risk of terrorist attacks in the 
United States.46  
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Other recommendations derived from the CCA involve the development of national 
U.S. guidance templates for formally requesting information after first leveraging the 
CCA three-step informal information-sharing method. When instances of formalized 
information sharing might be necessary between the U.S. fire service and its homeland 
security partners, templates similar to those required by the CCA may be useful.47 
The international, national, and local comparisons and smart practices presented in 
this article may provide the catalyst for increased systematic, operational, and legal 
information sharing between the fire service and homeland security partners.  
CONCLUSION  
There is nothing permanent except change. 
—Heraclitus of Greece48 
Over eight years have passed since the release of the first National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, yet little progress has been made toward solving the Gordian knot 
of information sharing between the U.S. fire service’s million plus fire personnel and the 
homeland security community.49 Unfortunately, we cannot simply cleave the knot in 
two. We must rely on a variety of acumen ranging from strategic and policy expertise to 
the most fundamental tactical skills, in order to develop horizontally- and vertically-
oriented policies, strategies, and tactics to identify and share potential terrorist-related 
information and intelligence.50 
This article presents an analysis of four information-sharing systems relating to 
terrorism and all-hazard strategies, policies, and programs, in an attempt to identify if 
U.S. fire personnel should participate in terrorism-related information sharing and – if 
they should participate – to consider the legal, political, and operational boundaries.  
The research for this article produced three universal or macro-level findings. The 
first indicates that U.S. firefighters have legal, moral, and ethical responsibilities to 
gather and share potential terrorist-related information that could assist the homeland 
security community in preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks. Second, these 
responsibilities must be conducted within the context of a 250-year U.S. fire service 
enterprise founded on saving lives and property while maintaining exemplary 
trustworthiness, reliability, and credibility with the public. The third inclusive finding 
was that legal and operational issues may be addressed by firefighters using 
standardized terrorist indicators while operating as sensors of opportunity during 
emergency and non-emergency operations, but fire personnel must not be specifically 
asked or assigned to gather information on suspected terrorists or terrorist activities. 
A strategic recommendation is to modify the NSIS to include the local fire service as 
an information-sharing leader in some situations (see Appendix 2 for suggested NSIS 
language). For example, based on England’s CCA, a modified NSIS might enhance 
collaborative information-sharing through the creation and maintenance of formalized, 
fire department coordinated, local and regional information sharing plans.  Also, for the 
purpose of ensuring that the information sharing plans are actionable and effective, the 
fire department would lead in the training and exercising of the plans. The training and 
exercises would include all public and private agencies identified in each area’s 
information sharing plan. 
HEIRSTON, FIREFIGHTERS AND INFORMATION SHARING 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 2 (MAY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
16 
Suggested smart practices identified in this research range from four common 
terrorist indicators that every firefighter should know to the creation of national U.S. 
guidance templates (based on the CCA model) for formally and informally requesting 
classified information. 
Possibly more important than all the findings, recommendations, plans, and smart 
practices identified in this article is the acknowledgment of who firefighters are and 
what they can do to prevent or disrupt terrorism through information sharing. Since 
before the time of Fire Chief Benjamin Franklin the fire service has been built on the 
legal, moral, and ethical commitment to protect U.S. citizens through prevention and 
response. For me, as a potential collector and consumer of potential terrorism (and all 
hazards) related information, the continued sporadic, unstructured, ad hoc information 
sharing system is unacceptable.  
We are at war, and war calls for risks if we are to prevail. One of the risks of using fire 
personnel to collect information in plain sight is the tarnishing of our reputation or 
possible legal action. That risk is considerably less than dealing with the consequences 
of the attacks on the Murrah Building, the World Trade Center, or more horrendous acts 
of terrorism. We must continue to build on the U.S. fire service’s long and successful 
history of information sharing to prevent fires and other disasters; when these 
prevention efforts fail, our citizens and emergency responders deserve a solid 
information sharing response.  
More than eight years ago the terrorist attacks of 9/11 became the catalyst for the U.S. 
expansion of information gathering and sharing with non-traditional partners such as 
the fire service. Now is the time for action. The significant value of fire personnel’s 
prevention of life and property loss from terrorism through the use of standardized 
terrorist indicators and formalized collaboration with the homeland security community 
should not be underestimated. The more than one million U.S. fire personnel serving in 
over 30,000 fire departments may be a phenomenal resource for our homeland security 
partners, and our homeland security partners could be a valuable resource for 
firefighters and other first responders. If the strategic and operational recommendations 
identified in this article are implemented by the nation’s fire personnel, the volume of 
suspicious-activity reporting should increase and with it the potential for preventing or 
disrupting future terrorism in the United States. Citizens will be safer and, in my 
opinion, will appreciate their firefighters stepping up, as they have historically done to 
prevent life and property loss in our country.  
 
Bryan Heirston recently retired as a deputy fire chief for the Oklahoma City Fire Department 
with more than twenty-five years of fire service. During the course of his career, he served as 
incident commander, section chief, hazardous materials specialist, water rescue diver, peer 
counselor, firefighter, and in other positions at scores of events including the 1995 Murrah 
Building bombing, 2001 World Trade Center bombing, and hurricane Katrina in 2005. Mr. 
Heirston is a graduate of the National Fire Academy’s four-year Executive Fire Officer 
Program and holds a master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School.  He may be 
contacted as bch1@cfl.rr.com.  
HEIRSTON, FIREFIGHTERS AND INFORMATION SHARING 
 
 




Suggested Language for the National Strategy for Information Sharing 
“Sharing Information” Section  
The current National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) “Sharing Information 
with State, Local and Tribal Governments” section could be modified to include the 
language shown below (extrapolated from the CCA Part One Regulations 55-57, “Role of 
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority”). A new open-source information-
sharing plan involving local fire departments may improve formal and informal 
information sharing between the U.S. fire service and other homeland security partners 
and may potentially prevent or disrupt terrorism.  
 
Current NSIS Language: To implement recommendations developed pursuant to 
Guideline 2 of the President’s Guidelines, and as key participants in the information-
sharing mission, State, local, and tribal entities are encouraged to undertake the 
following activities, in appropriate consultation and coordination with Federal 
departments and agencies. 
 
Recommended NSIS Language 
A.  Role of local or regional fire service authority 
In communities with established fire service, it shall be the responsibility of fire chief of 
the fire service to: 
(1) Ensure that a collaborative open-source information-sharing plan is created and 
maintained. The fire chief shall be responsible for ensuring that all agencies, public and 
private, associated with the area homeland security, emergency services, and critical 
infrastructure sectors identified in the National Response Framework participate. The 
information-sharing plan will include informal and formal information-sharing systems 
or processes associated with potential man-made or natural disasters, including 
terrorist attacks for the pre-defined area, urban area, state homeland security region, or 
other mutually accepted area(s). 
(2) On behalf of all relevant homeland security, emergency services, and critical 
infrastructure sector participants who have functions that are exercisable in the 
identified area, the fire department will be the authority having jurisdiction and will 
take the lead responsibility for exercising the information-sharing plan in relation to 
area-wide emergencies in accordance with the Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program; and 
(3) At the request of relevant homeland security, emergency services, or critical 
infrastructure sector partners who have functions that are exercisable in the area, assist 
sector and private partners in: 
(i) carrying out exercises for the purpose of ensuring that the information-sharing 
plan maintained by that relevant sector or partner is appropriate for the risk(s); 
(ii) the inter-sector training of responders or other persons for the purposes of 
ensuring that the plan is actionable and effective. 
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B.  Role of other homeland security, emergency services, and critical 
infrastructure sector partners 
 
Homeland security, emergency services, and critical infrastructure sector partners who 
have functions that are exercisable in the pre-determined area, shall cooperate with the 
fire service authority having jurisdiction in connection with the performance by that 
authority of its functions under paragraph A(1). 
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CCA Information Request Process 
Below is the CCA guidance document template for formally requesting information. 
 
 
Once a formal request has been made, a formal response is required. Below is the CCA 
guidance document template for response to a formal request for information. 
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